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Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision
Making among Heterogeneous
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)
members at the Central Bank of Nigeria
Ezema, C. C., O. J.Odonye, T. S. Shitile and O. O. Afiemo*
Abstract
This paper provided an empirical analysis of policy-makers' voting patterns on interest rates
in Nigeria. Employing a (pooled) Taylor rule and using real-time data obtained from
published personal statements of monetary policy committee members at the Central Bank
of Nigeria (CBN), the paper tests for preference heterogeneity among MPC members. The
aggregate reaction function as well as individual reaction functions for MPC members were
used to tests whether there is a difference between the voting patterns of internal members
and that of external members of the committee. Our results suggest evidence of
heterogeneity among MPC members and that the voting patterns of the internal members
are statistically different from that of the external members.

Keywords: Panel Data Analysis, Interest Rate Decision, Monetary Policy, Central
Banking
JEL Classification: C23, E43, E52, E58

I.

Introduction

T

he Central Bank of Nigeria Act, 2007 granted operational autonomy to the
Bank and, in accordance with global practice, created the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC).1 According to Section 12 Sub-sections (1-5) of the Act, the
Committee is made of 12 members, comprising the Governor, as the Chairman,
the four Deputy Governors, two members representing the Board of Directors of
the Bank, three members to be appointed by the President of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria, and two members to be appointed by the Governor of the Bank. The
Committee, which is responsible for setting interest rates for the economy, meets
every two months to consider developments in domestic and global economies
and on the basis of their considerations take actions that signal monetary policy
stance.
*The authors are staff of the Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of Nigeria. The usual disclaimer applies.
1Monetary policy decisions by a committee are now more common than by a single policy-maker, for example,
the Central Bank of New Zealand and the Central Bank of Israel.
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Extant literature emphasises the valuable implications of diversity in monetary
policy committees (Chappell et. al., 1997, Harris and Spencer 2009, Jung and Kiss
2012, Apel et. al., 2013). Particularly, diversity of views across members reflecting in
large part, skills, backgrounds and individual preferences, is an important feature
of the decision making process. To introduce heterogeneity, the committee
members are usually drawn from people with different backgrounds including
banking sector, academia, government and other relevant professions. The CBN
publishes personal statements of MPC members which includes information
concerning members' voting records. This voting record provides valuable
information on the preference behaviour and diversity among Committee
members and the short-term interest rate expectations (Horvath, Smidkova and
Zapal, 2010).Thus, when a committee member holds a contrary view to the
majority, the position is registered by casting a dissenting vote which is recorded in
the personal statement of such a member.
Gerlach-Kristen (2006) argues that revealing the diversities among MPC members
tend to make central banks more predictable, which in turn, supports anchoring of
inflation expectations and smoothing interest rates volatilities. More importantly,
studies of preference heterogeneity in developing countries are scarce and in
some jurisdictions not available. Furthermore, since knowledge of preference
heterogeneity helps anchor inflation expectation, it is prudent that this study be
given adequate attention in Nigeria in view of the importance of price stability in
the Bank's mandate.
Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008) have argued that systematic differences among
members of MPC are critical to the decision-making process of monetary policy
committees. King (2002) emphasises the pooled-knowledge benefits of
committees over individuals in decision making process and pointed out that
diverse opinion during discussions at each MPC meetings are crucial to the
committee's performance. It is against this backdrop that this study sets out to
investigate the interest rate setting behaviour of MPC members at the Central
Bank of Nigeria with a view to testing the heterogeneity hypotheses among
members. In particular, the study estimates both aggregate and individual Taylorrule functions for MPC members at the CBN in order to establish the voting pattern
of members and whether they are affected by type of membership, such as
internal vs external members. In other words, we want to establish whether the
voting patterns of internal members are statistically different from that of the
external members.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section two discusses monetary policy
process at the central bank of Nigeria, with some stylised facts regarding
preference behaviour of MPC members. Section three contains literature review,
while Section four discusses the methodology employed, and specifies empirical
models used to test heterogeneity in MPC decisions. Section five discusses the
results of the empirical analysis while Section six contains policy implications, and
conclusions.

II.

Monetary Policy Process at the Central Bank of Nigeria

II.1

Compositions of MPC

The Monetary Policy Committee at the Central Bank of Nigeria (MPC) was created
in 2007 by an Act of Parliament (CBN Act. 2007). In Nigeria, decisions on the design,
formulation and implementation of monetary policy are made by this Committee.
Table 1 shows the members of MPC, their institutional affiliations, as well as their
membership status.
Table 1: Monetary Policy Committee Members as at December 2013
Status

Institutional
Affiliation

Basis for Membership

Governor and
Chairman
Dep.Gov. and
Member
Dep.Gov. and
Member
Dep.Gov. and
Member
Dep.Gov. and
Member

CBN

Governor CBN

CBN

Deputy Governor

CBN

Deputy Governor

CBN

Deputy Governor

CBN

Deputy Governor

Orosanya Stephen

Board Member

Federal Min. of
Finance

Representing the Board

Anastasia M. DanielNwobia
Adedoyin R. Salami

Board Member

Ministry of Finance

Member

John Oshilaja

Member

Lagos Business
School
Consultant

Perm. Sec. Fed Min. of
Finance
Appointed by the CBN
Gov.
Appointed by the CBN
Gov.

Abdul-Ganiyu Garba

Member

ShehuYahaya

Member

Ahmadu Bello
University
AfDB

Chibuike U. Uche

Member

University of Nigeria

Sanusi L. Sanusi
TundeLemo
Sarah Alade
Suleiman Barau
Kingsley Moghalu

Source: Authors’ Compilation

Appointed by the
President
Appointed by the
President
Appointed by the
President
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II.2
Decision Making Process
The Bank has an independent committee responsible for monetary policy through
the setting of monetary policy rate (MPR). The Committee meets every other
month to review and discuss developments in both domestic and global
economies with a view to fine tuning policy decisions on interest rates and other
monetary policy instruments. During their meetings, the Committee is furnished
with Economic Reports prepared by staff members of the CBN that adumbrates
various developments in the domestic and global economies covering different
sectors as well as inflation forecasts. Based on these reports and their private
information and investigations, they discuss and take decisions on the policy rate
to guide market transactions for the next two months. The outcome is determined
by a simple majority of votes and which are often published.
Members come to the meeting with their individual perceptions about the
economy which may differ among them. They have similar public information set
augmented with private information in different forms which may be linked to a
particular background or proficiencies of individual members. This explains cases
of dissents from the consensus projection as some individual members tend to
attach varying importance to certain types of information than others. Later,
sharing of information occurs during the discussions at the committee meetings
(Geanakoplos, 1992; Bicchieri, 1993). Member's individual policy choice is
eventually based on private information as well as the shared information
obtained during discussions with colleagues at the meeting (Bhattacharjee and
Holly, 2006).
According to Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006), the MPC decision-making process is
in two-stages. The consideration of the state of the economy, involving
presentation of staff analysis and forecasts, and information sharing by members,
occur in the first stage (Gerlach-Kristen, 2003; Meade and Stasavage, 2004).The
second stage involves committee's discussion and interest rate setting decision.
Some committee members tend to take divergent positions from the central view
in spite of the information sharing by members. The differences in opinions are
usually on the state of the economy and the possible effects of interest rates
changes on inflation and output (Bhattacharjee and Holly, 2006).
During the voting periods, the chairman calls on members to vote on whether the
committee should retain, tighten or loosen monetary policy stance. Thereafter,
they vote on how much each member wants the policy rate to be changed with
the chairman stating the results or voting after every other member has voted.
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Each member is expected to vote for retention, tightening or loosening of the
policy rate and to state briefly the reasons for voting in that manner. After every
round of voting, another round of voting is conducted to check if any member has
been persuaded by the arguments of colleagues to change position. It is after this
round that a final decision is taken based on a simple majority.

II.3
MPC Voting Patterns at the Central Bank of Nigeria
This section discusses the voting pattern and characteristics of MPC members
between 2011 and 2013. The preference behaviour of committee members in
terms of both policy direction and the distribution of dissent was considered during
the period 2011 –2013. This reflects the period for which individual member's
personal statements were published. The individual statements contain each
member's preferred interest rate and explanations on why such a member chose
the rate.
The committee had 18 meetings from 2011 to 2013, an average of 6 meetings per
year. The frequency of policy rate change reduced from 83 per cent in 2011 to
zero per cent in 2012 and 2013, indicating its general bias to policy tightening
during the reviewed period. The preference for tightening during the 2012-2013
period reflects the Committee's efforts to curb inflationary pressures arising from
persistent excess liquidity in the banking system during this period.
Figure 1 shows that in the period 2011 to 2013, the committee retained interest rates
more than they did tighten or loosen. In particular, the committee tightened 5
times, and loosened only once in 2011.
Figure 1: Summary of MPC Decisions 2011-2013

Source: Authors’ Compilation & Computation
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Figure 2 shows the key voting characteristics of MPC members in a three year
period, 2011-2013. There is observed variance between internal and external
members of the committee in their voting patterns. Unlike the former, the external
members usually dissent for tightening than easing policy rates.
Figure 2: Key Voting Characteristics of MPC Members 2011-2013

14
10
8
6

Yahaya

Uche

Salami

Oshilaja

Olofin

Moghalu

Retain
Lemo

0
Garba

Loosen
Danladi

2
Barau

Tightening

Alade

4

Sanusi

No. of Meetings

12

Source: Authors’ Compilation & Computation

Table 2 shows the voting pattern of MPC members between 2011 and 2013. During
this period, about 46 per cent of the decisions were taken by unanimity, a relatively
significant ratio. In 2011, for example, dissents in favour of tightening constitute
about 83 per cent of the decisions taken, retention of interest rate amounted to
about 16.67 per cent while there was no decision to ease policy stance during the
period. The voting statistics also show that the “activism” ratio (the ratio of
tightening to the overall policy decisions) was 80 per cent, a significantly high
activism ratio.
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Table 2: Key Voting Pattern of MPC (2011-2013)
Key Voting Characteristics of Monetary Policy Committee 2011-2013
2011

2012

2013

Number of Voting members

12

12

12

Internal members

5

5

5

External members

7

7

7

Number of meetings

6

6

6

Meetings with tightening

5

0

0

Meetings with easing

0

0

0

Meetings with no changes

1

6

6

Tightening (per cent)

83.33

0

0

Easing (per cent)

0.00

0

0

Retain (per cent)

16.67

100

100

Frequency of policy rate changes

Source: Authors’ Compilation & Computation

III.

Literature Review

III.1

Theoretical Literature

Several theoretical literature describe preference heterogeneity in MPC decision
making process. A number of studies including Gerlach-Kristen (2003) and Horvath
et. al., (2010) have shown that some degree of dissent offer very useful information
about future policy direction.
Thus, dissent among committee members could be a useful aspect of the
monetary policy process. In preferring interest rates increase when inflationary
pressure is high, the behaviour of committee members is said to be in tandem with
economic theory and to be exhibiting homogeneity in policy preferences even
with heterogeneous policy reaction functions. The systematic heterogeneity of
members is linked to their membership type (whether external or internal), career
and professional background (such as central banking, private sector, public
sector or academia) which eventually translate to biased reaction function
notwithstanding the projections (Horvath et. al., 2010).
The information cascade model developed by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch, (1998) suggests that committee members base their preferences beyond
their own personal information prior to the meeting. They incorporate opinions of
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central bank staff articulated in the staff report to the MPC in addition to
information gathered from fellow members during discussions at meetings.
However, members attach varying weights to this information in their judgments
and interest rate setting choice which may be attributed to their backgrounds in
terms of type of membership, profession, expertise and length of time served as
MPC member. Bhattacharjee and Holly (2006) observed that MPC decisionmaking is in two stages. First is consideration based on the economic
developments and information sharing during meetings and two, decisions which
are reached by majority of votes, cast by members.
Meade and Stasavage, (2004) noted that there are basically two groups in every
MPC committee, namely the “Hawkish” and the “Dovish” groups. The hawkish
group are those who believe that price stability should be achieved by
aggressively raising interest rates to tame aggregate demand. The dovish group
comprise of developmentalists who believe that the best approach to achieving
price stability is to create a conducive environment for growth by ensuring that
credit is available to economic agents at affordable prices. For them, lower
interest rates will unlock credits to the private sector which in turn increases
production and subsequently leads to reduced prices. This is akin to the Backus
and Driffill (1985) model of an in?nite-horizon sphere where two kinds of policy
makers exist: The first one is a strategy that encourages the maximisation of social
welfare while the second chooses zero inflation. Sibert (2002) suggests that policy
makers have varying reaction functions and tend to differ in voting pattern over
time due to strategic behaviour.
The voting behaviour is crucial in understanding the observed heterogeneity
among MPC members across central banks. Causes of dissent voting behaviour
include internal and external status, skills and experiences of members amongst
others. The information provided in the voting records or the minutes of the
committee show dissenting voters and the direction of the voting (ease or
tightness) at each meeting which allows behavioural analysis of dissent voting.
Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005), considered a Committee arrangement where
there are three distinct sources of uncertainty: (1) committee members may differ
on their reaction function to interest rates, inflation and output, giving rise to
different policy rules; (2) Members may have access to different private
information sets leading to heterogeneity in their individual policy rules.
Information asymmetries in committee decision making are explained by diverse
professional experiences, information handling skills and independent “private”
information. These information asymmetries tend to increase with the committee's

78

79

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

September 2014

size (Erhart and Vasquez-Paz, 2007); (3) Members may also have diverse opinions
about the size of the output gap and in?ation expectations. Therefore committee
members are bound to hold different preferences and policy views even as they
respect the strategy and the objective of the central bank.

III.2

Empirical Literature Review

Empirical studies on the preference behaviour of MPC members are relatively few,
with existing ones concentrating on monetary policy committees of advanced
economies of America and Europe. Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008) studied the
Bank of England MPC using the standard New Keynesian framework, allowing
members to hold different views and have different weights attached to output
and inflation stabilisation. The study revealed that MPC members are equally
homogeneous in their policy preferences but differ in their policy reaction
functions which may be linked to the nature of their membership and career
backgrounds. Besley et. al.,(2007) investigated heterogeneity hypothesis of the
Bank of England MPC by comparing coefficients of individual policy reaction
functions using vote records of the Committee members. The results suggest the
existence of heterogeneity in the Bank of England MPC decisions making.
Havrilesky and Gildea (1991), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), Gildea (1990), and
Belden (1989) have studied the US Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
decisions using descriptive statistics. They analysed differences in the voting
behaviour of the Board members and have revealed that external and internal
members differ in voting patterns and that the former dissent more by voting for a
lower interest rate.
Spencer (2006) and Gerlach-Kristen (2003) also investigated the voting pattern at
the Bank of England MPC using dissenting votes by comparing dissenting
frequencies between internal and external members. The findings of both studies
mirrored the one obtained on heterogeneous preference of the US FOMC
members by Havrilesky and Gildea (1991), Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990),
Gildea (1990), and Belden (1989). Contrary to Havrilesky and Gildea (1991),
Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990), Gildea(1990), and Belden (1989); Tootell (1991,
1999) find no methodical variation in the US FOMC members' voting patterns.
Apel et. al., (2013) examined heterogeneity in MPC members' preferences in
Sweden and Norway. They employed a direct approach using standard loss
function. Some of their findings suggest significant preferences heterogeneity at
the Riksbank and Norges Bank MPC; that nature of membership (external vs
internal) has effects on preference distribution within the MPC committees.

Ezema et. al.,: Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making among Heterogeneous MPC members
Jung and Kiss (2012) have investigated preference heterogeneity of the central
bank of Hungary MPC and the National Bank of Poland MPC during the period
2005- 2010. They employed (individual) voting records and estimated (pooled)
Taylor-type reaction functions of the committee using economic and financial
information and voting records. The study suggests that diversity by voting pattern
was an essential characteristic of MPC. It also finds random preference
heterogeneity among committee members and attributes preferences variation
to membership status (chairman, internal member, external member).
While the existing literature contains information on heterogeneity of MPC
members of selected central banks (in the U.S. and U.K.), researchers have paid
relatively little attention to the issues of preference heterogeneity among
committee members in less developed economies. Currently, there is little,
empirical evidence on the preference heterogeneity in decision making process
among committee members at the CBN. A robust investigation into the voting
pattern at MPC meetings in Nigeria is required to strengthen existing knowledge
and to inform policy makers about the implications of some of their actions on the
overall policy objective of the Bank. A number of questions have not been robustly
discussed among scholars concerning MPC activities in Nigeria. What is the
reaction function of the MPC members? Are there significant differences among
members' preferences? What are the sources of such differences? These and other
key questions are critical to monetary policy making and answers to such questions
would provide improve monetary policy process in Nigeria.

IV. Methodology
This section discusses the model of MPC decision making process and approach
for estimating its parameters. The policy implication of individual MPC members
expressed through interest rate reaction functions are specified in the model, while
analysing the interactions between these policy preferences and final interest
setting decision of the committee. This allows estimation of the policy reaction
functions of individual committee members.
IV.1
Reaction Function of the Monetary Policy Committee
The study estimates pooled Taylor-type reaction functions of the CBN Monetary
Policy Committee. In addition to information from staff reports, inflation forecasts
generated from Research Department of the CBN, output projections form part of
the broad data/statistics available to MPC members at the time of policy
decisions.
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Nigeria's economy is small and open; import price changes and exchange rate
volatility have a significant inflationary implication. Thus, exchange rate changes
influence discussions at the MPC meeting. Given this scenario, the Taylor rule is
either modified by incorporating exchange rate variation as an independent
variable or a replacement of the output gap in the policy rate model. Our model
depends on the traditional monetary policy rule by Taylor (1993) and its
modification by Svensson (1997) and other studies.
t

+

Et(

*
t

(

i=

+

E t ( yt — y* ) + pi t –1 +

(1)

t

The nominal policy interest rate, i is the rate agreed by members at time, t and is
a function of the preference parameter, . The predicted inflation gap, i.e. the
*
deviation of forecast inflation from actual inflation is given as E t ( t
while
the predicted output gap i.e. the deviation of actual output from potential output
*
is E t ( t
. At the CBN, MPC members normally consider inflation forecasts, 6
months ahead instead of inflation gap2. For our analysis, therefore, we use inflation
forecast in the next 6 months in place of inflation gap. In line with extant literature,
the lagged value of the policy rate.
t

(

(

For Nigeria, the conventional policy reaction function can be adjusted to
incorporate other variables relevant to our own environment. Thus the reaction
function for CBN is expressed as:

+ i t –1+ E t (

*

t

(

Ri=

+

*

E t ( yt — y )+ .... +

+

D ifft –1+

Dum +

t

(2)

Where R denotes the agreed policy interest rate at the end of the meeting. In
addition to the use of the conventional Taylor-rule type of variables to explain
voting behaviour, our specifications include three additional variables capturing
specific features of the economy and some individual members characteristics:
One variable captures the effect of exchange rate fx, the other captures the
difference between member j’s period (t –1) chosen policy rate and the MPC's
period (t –1) policy rate (hereafter denoted as (Difft –1 ). This last term represents
the magnitude of individual dissent and majority view of the committee in the
previous meeting. Therefore, Difft –1 =0 implies that an individual has casted assent
vote while a positive or negative value of Diff t –1 denotes dissent vote in favour of
tightening or losing interest rate, respectively. Finally, a dummy variable is
includedto capture the effects of member type, hereafter denoted as DUM which
2A horizon of about 3 months ahead corresponds to the policy horizon normally considered by the

committee.
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takes the value 1 when a member is an internal member and zero otherwise. If DUM
is significant, it is interpreted the voting patterns of the internal members are
different from that of the external members.
Individual Policy Reaction Functions
Since we are interested in individual preferences, a more robust alternative to the
aggregate Taylor rule is a reaction function in which parameters are allowed to
vary across MPC members. If only the intercept changes with the N MPC members,
then we have a Fixed Effect (FE) model which can be written in the form
j

+

i t –1+ E

t

(

*

t

(

ij , t =

+

*

E t ( yt — y )+ .... +

+

D ifft –1 +

j,t

(3)

j = 1,…, N.
,
Where ij , t , is the preferred interest rates for the individual members and j , t is the
individual error term for the jth member. All other variables remain as defined in
equation (2). The variables inflation, output gap and nominal foreign exchange
rate may vary over time but not across individual members.
IV.2
Estimation Procedure
Each committee meeting was treated as an observation, and we recognise
members' vote for interest rate setting decision as either maintaining the status quo
policy rate or for rate increase or decrease. For each rate reported higher than the
agreed rate, we term 'tightening' and for each rate that is lower than the agreed
MPR rate, we term 'easing'. If a vote cast is equal to the agreed MPR rate, we term it
'maintain status quo'. To account for possible inertia in policymaking, and interest
rate smoothing strategies of the MPC, we include the lagged policy interest rate as
an explanatory variable in the equation. Output gap is computed by
decomposing real GDP into its trend and deviation components using the HodrickPrescott filter. Thereafter we used an interpolation method known as “quadratic
match sum” to obtain the monthly series. We used the 6 months inflation forecasts
to proxy for the expected inflation.
We estimate the 'Fixed effects' and the 'Random effects' models for the aggregate
reaction function. We use the Hausman test to check whether model parameters
of the fixed and random effects are statistically different from each other. The
preliminary indication for systematic variances in the preference parameter
) is the rejection of the random effects model across members. The
intercept (a
variable,DUM, represents the dummy variable indicating the type of membership
for each MPC member, i.e. whether internal or external member. The variable,
DUM, assumes the value 1 if a member is an internal member and assumes the
value 0 (zero) if a member is an external member.
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If the coefficient of the dummy variable is statistically significant, it suggests that the
voting patterns of external members are significantly different from the voting
patterns of the internal ones. This condition confirms evidence of heterogeneity
among MPC members.
IV.3

Data and Sources

Monthly data were collected for all variables covering the period, March 2011 to
December 2013. This period is chosen to coincide with period that MPC personal
statements were made available to the public. The data sets used for the
econometric investigation are the agreed policy rates (MPR that is
communicated to the general public at the end of the meeting), individual
members' policy rate preferences for that meeting, the output gap and inflation
forecast for 6 months ahead exchange rate We use the exchange rate at the BDC
segment of the foreign exchange market. This rate is preferred since more users
access this segment more than other segments. Data on inflation forecasts were
obtained from Research Department of the central Bank of Nigeria while
exchange rates are available at the CBN website. Policy rates for each meeting
are from MPC Communiqués published immediately after every meeting,
individual policy rate preferences are obtained from the records of their personal
statements.

V.

Presentation and Discussion of Results

V.1

Descriptive Statistics

Tables 3 and 4 show the descriptive statistics and the correlation coefficients
among the variables used in the regression. Except for the Forecast inflation, all the
variables are negatively skewed suggesting the presence of left tail while the
Kurtosis of the variables, except RGDP, are close to three suggesting that they are
not high peaked. The Jaque-Bera statistics obtained could not reject the
hypothesis of normal distribution for all the variables except MPR.
The correlation coefficients are shown in Table 4. The table reveal that the
correlation coefficient between the current and forecast inflation and between
the MPR and exchange rate are high. For this reason there is a high threat of
autocorrelation. However, we dropped the forecast inflation, (which is not
significant), lagged MPR was used as an explanatory variable instead of the
current value.

Ezema et. al.,: Analysis of Monetary Policy Decision Making among Heterogeneous MPC members
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
i

t

i

t

?

1

L

?

*

Lfx

LGDP

gap

LDiff

t

?

1

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

11.20455
12.00000
12.00000
7.500000
1.584168
-1.528230
3.506051

11.90456
12.00000
12.450000
8.300000
1.684167
-1.428260
3.501050

10.30848
10.10000
13.70000
7.800000
1.483933
0.510988
2.748048

157.85848
157.45000
169.90000
145.27800
1.733696
-0.093273
1.562937

11.20222
11.22402
11.44551
10.92007
0.146234
-0.169838
1.791916

0.943954
0.2045883
45.058282
0.2509781
0.014901
-0.898005
2.663798

Jarque-Bera
Probability
Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

13.19730
0.001362
369.7500
80.30682

13.49830
0.000162
368.7600
82.36481

1.523382
0.466876
340.1800
70.46582

2.887430
0.236049
348.1000
96.18242

2.165414
0.338678
369.6734
0.684300

4.590689
0.100727
166.4505
0.007105

Observations

33

33

33

33

33

33

Source: Author’s computation

Table 4: Correlation Coefficients among Variables
Correlation
t-Statistic
Lfx

Lp
*

LGDPgap

LDifft it1
1

it

Lfx

1.000000

-0.715511

-0.355217

0.000115

0.785511

0.215747

Lp
*

-0.715511
-0.355217

1.000000
0.468656

0.141547
1.000000

0.00120
0.00000

-51669121
0.251243

-0.669121
0.261240

0.194299
LDifft 1

-0.168352

0.00000

1.000000

0.251243

0.000150

it1

0.785511

-51669121

0.251243

0.397419

1.000000

0.9700000

it

0.584521

0.66789

0.2651240

0.000150

LGDPgap

0.9700000

1.000000

Source: Author’s computation

V.2

Results of the Aggregate Reaction Function

Equation (2) represents the monetary policy reaction function for the MPC
members at the Central Bank of Nigeria using aggregate data. The coefficients of
the variables were obtained using ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation of the
reduced-form equation derived from our model to explain the post meeting
Monetary Policy Rate. The results of this analysis will be compared with the
coefficients of the individual members' reaction function equations to determine
whether there is the presence of heterogeneity among MPC members in their
preferences rates.
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Table 5 indicates that the inflation and output gap variables are positively signed in
accordance with a priori expectations. In addition the two variables jointly differ
from zero (p = 0.00015 and p = 0.00011 respectively). The inflation forecast was
consistently not significant and wrongly signed. Thus, we replaced the forecast
with a three month lead inflation figure Lp
(+
3)* which became strongly significant
at 1 per cent level of significance ( p value =0.0015).
It appears the committee focuses on 3-month inflation expectation and not six
month inflation forecast. The results of our analysis suggest that the voting pattern
of MPC members in Nigeria is consistent with theory. In the first place, estimates of
the lead inflation coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting that members
vote to raise the policy rate when inflation expectations is high. The coefficient of
output gap is also positive and significant ( p value =0.00011) indicating that the
committee lowers rate when the output gap widens in other to boost aggregate
demand. Members tend to vote to increase the policy rate when the local
currency is perceived to have depreciated or when there are pressures at the
foreign exchange market. It is expected that higher interest rates will engender
foreign capital inflows into the country. If exchange rates appreciate more than
the committee deems optimal, they tend to reduce policy rates which creates
liquidity in the banking system. This motivates the Bank to play actively in the
foreign exchange market which tends to bring the exchange rate to its optimal
level.
The coefficient of the lagged values of the policy rate (i t– 1 ) is high and significant
suggesting considerable inertia in policymaking (the parameter, has magnitude
of 0.652302 and p — value=0.0000). The high value of the coefficient in our model
suggests that variations in the interest rate at any time, t, are explained by the
previous interest rate reflecting the Bank's efforts at interest rates smoothing.
It is also instructive to note that the slope of the lagged interest rate is larger in the
aggregate reaction function compared to the magnitude in the individual
reaction function. The Committee is more reluctant in changing interest rate than
individual members some of who may be more disposed to changing interest rates
more frequently than the Committee decisions. This may be an indication of
preference heterogeneity among the Committee members.
The term, Diff t–1 measures the magnitude of individual dissent in relation to the
Committee's decision. A Diff t–1 =0 implies that the individual casts a consent vote
while a positive and negative values indicate that individual dissents in favour of
tightening and easing rates, respectively . The coefficient of Diff t-1 is consistently
negative and significant indicating that members dissent particularly towards
lowering interest rates.
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Monetary policy committees are often differentiated based on their membership
status, as in external or internal. Thus, preference heterogeneity has been ascribed
to this type of membership status. Member type (dummy Variable used as proxy for
internal and external membership) is important – Member type is positively and
statistically significant at the 5 per cent, suggesting that internal and external
members vote differently from each other during the sample period. Thus member
type could be one source of heterogeneity among MPC members in Nigeria
Table 5: Parameter Estimates for the MPC Aggregate Reaction Function
Dep. Variable: Policy Rate
C

Coefficient
-0.327532
-0.250710

Std. Error
0.09548
0.424271

t-Statistic
-2.759672
3.777064

Prob.
0.04549**
0.51304

LGDPgap

0.146443

0.051358

2.825127

0.00011***

Lp
(+
3) *

0.465411

0.014487

2.597245

0.00015**

it1

0.652302

0.116064

5.620189

0.0000***

DU M

0.250780

0.125390

1.80001

0.02100**

Difft1

-0.02450

0.008479

2.88942

0.0024***

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression

0.732697
0.701421
0.326780

Mean dependent variable
S.D. dependent v ariable
Akaike info criterion

11.25000
1.519222
1.285446

Sum squared residue

2.379492

Schwarz criterion

1.521187

Log likelihood
F-statistic

-13.63897
83.15029

Hannan-Quinn criterion
Durbin-Watson stat

1.359277
1.718774

Prob.(F-statistic)

0.000000

Lp
*

V.3

Individual Members Reaction Function

The previous section is an aggregate analysis of MPC voting pattern. The analysis is
performed as a crude proxy to measure differences in the policy preferences
across committee members. It relates the number of dissents to total votes. The
inferences drawn from the analyses are first indication of diversity across
committee members. The aggregate measure is, however, sample average that
does not indicate nor account for the pattern of dissents. This section reports the
results of the pooled regression estimates as a way of confirming the differences
among MPC members as suggested in the previous section and to investigate the
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possible sources of these differences. Table 6 shows the results of the individual
reaction functions (equation 4) of the Committee members as computed using
pooled data analysis of all the Committee members voting records. The upper
panel shows the parameter estimates for the common variables, the economic
variables that do not differ across MPC members. The size of these coefficients and
their empirical significance are quite comparable across different specifications.
Except for the inflation forecast variable, all other variables are significant and in
line with theory. The lower panel of the Table shows the individual intercepts or the
fixed effects for each committee member. They are interpreted as how much
individual preferences deviates from the committee mean. They measure
preference heterogeneity among MPC members. The results at the lower panel
confirm preference heterogeneity among MPC members in Nigeria.
The results of the estimates are quite interesting. As in the aggregate reaction
function, the results of the individual reaction function reported in Table 6 indicate
that the inflation and output parameters are correctly signed and significant. MPC
members individually tend to vote for higher rates if inflation expectations are high
and tend to vote for lower rates when growth performance is poor and that their
preferences are jointly different from zero. Substantial inertia exist in policy making,
as the parameter of the one period lagged interest rate is high and significant.
Moreover, observed differences in the coefficients of the lagged values of the
policy rate between aggregate regression and the pooled regression, as
established by Wald-tests, suggest that an individual policy-maker is more inclined
to changing his policy rate than committees as a whole. Policy rate reacts
positively to depreciation of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the US dollar. The
parameter estimate for the exchange rate,

remained positive and significant in
d

all the models suggesting that the exchange rate play crucial role in the interest
rate decisions of the committee.
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Table 6: Parameter Estimates for the Individual MPC Members Reaction Functions
Coefficient
Standard Error
t-statistic
p-value
c
Lp
*
LGDP
LGDPgap
gap
*
Lp
(
+
3
)
*
IIt-1t-1
Diff
Difft-1 t-1

31.472451

7.151190

4.401009

0.000000

-0.532345

0.497863
0.210315
0.170769
0.200592
0.015798

1.069260
2.578416
1.809129
3.219205
-2.061457

0.056102
0.001580
0.043245
0.002430
0.021045

0.284438
0.308943
0.645748
-0.032567

Fixed Effects
Individual Intercepts
C_SANUSI
C_LEMO
C_ALDE
C_SULEIMAN
C_KINGSLEY
C_OLOFIN
C_SALAMI
C_GARBA
C_YAHAYA
C_UCHE
C_OSHILAJA
C_KIFASI

( ’s)
0.671533
0.435678
0.645678
0.456735
0.412456
0.231568
0.185628
-0.145624
-0.127399
-0.201458
0.357894
-0.025439

VI.
Recommendations and Conclusion
The results of this study suggest the presence of heterogeneity among MPC
members in Nigeria. The voting behaviour of internal members is significantly
different from that of the external members and that there are significant
differences in the way individual policy members respond to shocks implying
higher inflationary pressures and/or lower output growth performances. One
aspect that require further investigation is the desirability of such voting outcomes.
The existence of external members is justified by the understanding that policy
meetings and decisions benefit from external skills and expertise as the external
members bring alternative views to the table. Evidence of this is readily found in the
minutes of MPC meetings.
Although it could be argued that at the CBN, internal members are members in the
minority, 5:7, it has been observed that appointment of two external members by
the Governor of the Bank and the nomination of one member to represent the
Board3 often turns such members to act like internal members as they are often
seen not ready to dissent governor's views on monetary policy. To this end, a review
of the nominations into the Committee to create a higher level of external
representation is recommended.
Differences across policy-makers are key characteristics of voting by monetary
policy committees. This study utilises the voting records obtained from MPC
3

The Governor as the Chairman of the Board often has powers to influence such nominee
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Communiqués and personal statements of MPC members at the Central Bank of
Nigeria together with available data on some key macroeconomic indicators to
assess the degree of diversity among members. The study used a panel reaction
function to analyse the voting pattern of CBN monetary policy committee. Our
findings are in line with the suggestions in literature that external and internal
members behave differently. Finally, a potential target for further research on this
issue would be to interrogate whether perceived preference heterogeneity in the
committees system impacts on the performance of the central banks in attaining
their mandate.
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